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By VALENTIN BUISSON
Ita 6pite of it" "wiJt collap,,~ i/& th~ 8tlmfMr oj /940. a'ut in 6ptJe of the "ad
~cJaele oJJH'ed by 'IR domul,c de1·el<>pn.enl.lI '';'It:e the1l. the French notion ill and
alu)oylf u-;ll /Je a 1)(1rt oj Eur&p~_ Europ~ hOIl much 10 thank the French people f&r
1.n the paRI a"d likewise c:rpect8 much from it in tI/.€ Jutur~. Fmnce's (lr~ut weak.
ne88 tod,.y i8 h 'r .•piritIUII uncertllinty and dilJullity. u..I.ich are on part the ruult of
hff 1nability to g t out oj the nIt oj tradilion-boulld. outdated th'1lhnlJ onto a new
poIh more in harmony with reality.
CO'llJincccl that a Iftudy of France'lf relat-ion.! to the rut of E"rope w;[l con.
tribute toward clarifying her pruenl paMlion.. we are nolC p.wl"'hi"fJ an al1icle
written by a Frenchman 1ivinu in Ecut ... .,ia. Like marlY of hill countrymen. the
author Ifuklf for the recuoM of the collap8e of yesterday bccolA.'c he I.opt.o to find in
them pointerl.t for the policy of tomorrow, (lml beccwlIe he ." concerned for France'.
future. He writes under a p8eudo/&ym.-K.M.
I F we observe the foreign policies ofthe five leading European powersduring the laat few centlU ies, we
arrive at the following picture.
Russia's traditional foreign policy was
that of expansion \\;th M.oscow aa its
center, and always in the direction of
least re istance, a policy which haa led
from a small principality ruled by I van
the Muneybag (early fourteenth century)
to the largest country in the world under
'talin.
In the case of Germany, on the other
hand, no clearly defined foreign policy is
discernible, since up to recent times
there waa no unified German state. The
Germany of the Middle Ages now khowl1
as the :First Reich, vaciUated in its
foreign policy between expanBion toward
the east and campaigns in Italy. The
8ubeequent dissolution of the First Reich
into countless small states rendered any
German foreign policy impolil5ible, al-
though some of the dynasties, snch as
the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns, con-
ducted their own dynastic foreign policies.
During this time it remained the most
important-although for IOllg periods un-
acknowledged-goal of the Germans to
form a united nation along the lines of
other European states. This goal was
DOt reached until modern times, under
Bismarck and Hitler. It is only now
that one can speak of a truly German
foreign policy which. during the laat few
years, has inscribed the foundation of a
united Europe on its banners.
The development in Italy was similar
to that in Germany. Here, t.oo, the goal
of a united and independent state WQ8
not achieved until 18iO. Onlv !lince
thell can we discern a real forcigri policy,
a policy directed at turning the Mediter-
ranean into the maTe nostrum and creating
a colonial empire in North Africa.
The Tudor kings of England, who laid
the foundation for England's oversea
oxpansion, introduced a policy toward
Europe which has since become the maxim
of British statesmanship: the balance of
power, in other words, the attempt always
to see to it that no single power achieve
hegemony on the European continent but
that the various camps always be more
or less in a state of balance. This policy
permitted England to devote herself
without serious interference to the build-
ing up of her world empire. Whenever
there was a threat of the establishment
of 11 European hegemony, England threw
her weight into the cales to restore the
balance. In pursuit of this policy Eng-
land ha.'l fought against every European
power: Spain, Hapsburg, Russia Germany
and, most often of all, against France.
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CLASSIC FOR:lflJLA . . .
France pursued the same policy toward
Gcrmany as England toward Europe.
• ince the days of Cardinal Richclieu.
:France saw in the Westphal.ian Peace
{1648). which ended thc Thirty Years'
War, an ideal solution to the German
question. a solution which became the
cia 'sic French foreign policy:
Germany territorialJy and politically
diflintegrated, each of her hundred of
princi palities jealously guarding its
"libertics"; her emperor elected by a
{)ommittee of princes, some of whom
could be influenced from outside; and the
[<'rench kings as protectors of this "Oer-
man liberty," the liberty of the Gcrman
princes to further their own interests at
the expense of thc Reich-in short, a
balance of power betwecn the various
German states which would make the
unification of the Germans into one
powcrful st,ate impossible.
France dreaded Cermany's unification
with a morbid fcar. It is true that the
FrC'tlch I{evolution of 17S9 tem porarily
replaced the classic French pol.icy by
8.dvucating the principle of nationalism
and f'clf-detcrmination for all nations.
1n l1is ::;1,. Helcna will, Napoleon I rec-
olllmcndcd f'ticking to this policy; and
~ap()ll'l)Jl III followcd his advice when
he ga\'c suppurt. to Italy in her unifica-
tilln. Hilt he rctul'I1ed to the classic
policy in J ~HH.i when Prussia undertook
the unificat,ion of Germa.ny. Italy paid
for France'l> support by handing Savoy
and Ni(:e to France. Bismarck refused
to pay for French consent with Cerman
tl'ITitory: he paid with the war of I SiO.
Had Lhe foreign-policy principle of the
French Rcvolution been followed con-
si··t.ently. it might have spared France
and Germany. and Europc as a whole
a good det~l of misery. But this policy
ha~ alway been opposed By those at-
t,ached to the classic svstem. In 1866,
uno, 1914, and 1!J39 th~ classic principle
prcvailed.
... A~D .. IDEE FIXE"
Between 1870 and 1914, France energet-
ically denied harboring seventeenth-
century aims against her neighbors and
accused Germany of being the aggressor.
During thc Great \\7ar , however, the
French again openly glorified the policy
and aims of Ca.rdinal Richelieu. Jacques
Bainville's Hisloi7'e de Deux Peuples,
written in 1916. enjoyed tremendous
success and went into welJ over three
hundr~ editions. It has remained the
popular political bible of the French, a
bible of Richelieu's political faith in which
republicans and monarchists believe alike.
It is significant that in 1935 Bainville was
elected a member of the Academie Fran-
yaise. Maurice Barres, another writer
a.nd mem bel' of this august body, calls
this policy "France's eternal thesis" or
"idee fixe." Frallce was inundated with
literature and pamphlets by which the
French people were made to forget their
revolution and familiarized once Illore
\\ ith the policy and aims of their former
monarchy and the meaning of the West-
phalian Peace. To perpetuate or renew
this state of German disunity has been
the aim of French diplomacy for hlUlclreds
of years. To COlUltcract it and to unify
the Germans, was. of course, the aim of
the leading German powers-principally
Austria and Prussia.
What effect did this situation have on
France's attitude toward the rest of
Europe!
The French Dmng nach Osten has been
noticeable in European histor.v since the
sixtcellth centmy, and this Drang was
still very much alive in 1!J39. Yes,
France, too, has her "urge toward the
east," an urge toward German territory.
SeeII from the point of view of former
centuries, this Frcnch urge must be con-
sidered j list a' natural as Lhe German
one. To conquer was then the noble
occupation of kings. Rut this does not
change the fact that the French Dra7lg
toward German territory and. simul·
taneouslv. the French "no" to Cerman
unity, n;ust he considered as one of the
main causes of the wars between France
and the Germans and of the continual
unrest in Europe. If, in these circum-
stances, France has in modern times
suffered invasions, she has not much
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ground for complaint. In former cen-
turies, German soil formed the battlefield
of Europe.
FRA....'lCE L'iD ENGLAND
Britain's "balance of power" doctrine
embraced the whole European continent,
including France. The British policy
allowed Germany to unite as a counter-
balance against united France, but only
as long as Germany did not transgre88
the proportions tolerable to England
within this law of balance. This policy
was not directed against Germany alone:
it was directed against any power on the
Continent which aspired to unite Europe
under its leadership. That should have
been a warning to France.
France's ambition for her own security,
well-being, and aggrandizement was dic-
tatorial preponderance 011 the Continent.
This automatically mane Britain her
enemy. Did not Clemenceau sav to
Lloyd George soon after the Great 'War:
"Half an hour after the Armistice I
already had the impre88ion that you had
again become tho enemy of France," to
which Lloyd George replied: "Has this
not l~lwn.ys been the traditiona.l policy of
my country?"
Thus tho community of interest be-
tween France and England was very
limited and existed only during the brief
stretches when their roads happened to
run parallel. In all other cases the
belief of France that she and England
had the same aim was unjustified opti-
mism; it, was a belief in tho possibility
of squaring the circle.
There was another difference between
London and Paris. As l\ continental
power, France had to fight her wars with
hor own sons. Consequently, Rhe wel-
comed any nat.ion contiguous to Ger-
many for permanent alliances, while
Britain ohose her allies only when the
necessity arose. Britain always remained
the master of her alliances; France often
became their slave. During Napoleon's
times and before, Prussia was good
enough to fight for England agaiJlBt
Napoleon; in 1914 and 1939, France was
~ood enough to fight against Ge[Dlany, to
bleed herself white and, finally, in 1940,
to collapse for the same old England.
All wars fought between France and
England after England had been driven
out of France in the fifteenth century
were caused by the British "balance of
power" policy. Up to the Napoleonic
wars, France exhausted her man power
and creative powers in wars against
England. When, toward the end of the
nineteenth century, England believed that
Germany was upsetting the balance of
power, she began to enlist allies against
Germany. The most important of these
was France.
In Britain it was the Prince of Wales,
later King Edward VII (1841-1910), who
was the motive force behind the group
opposing the rise of Germany. Married
to a Danish princess, he wanted his
mother, Queen Victoria, to intervene
against PrU88la in the German-Danish
war of 1864; and as early as 1866 he
explained to the French Ambassador in
London that an entente between France
and Britain would serve the best interests
of both countries. Queen Victoria re-
fused to please her son, but she died in
1901 and Edward beca.me King of Eng-
land. Still, it WIlS not altogether smooth
sailing for him. The French Republic
was anti-German all right, but at the
same time it had not forgotten the his-
tory of its relations with England. Her
colonial program had made France partic-
ularly anti-British.
COLONIAL POLICY
After 1871, Republican France at first
properly estimated her own forces and
knew well that national aspirations must
in the first instance be backed by one's
own national strength and creative genius.
Thus France had first of all to reorganize
herself and hope to recover her strength
by creating a great colonial empire, in
particular in North Africa. This diver-
sion from the Continent toward colonial
fields was exactly what Britain did not
like. She was afraid of French colonial
ambitions. If King Edward could direct
France's interest away from Mrica to
the Continent, she would cease being a
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r.ival in the colonial field and would be-
come England's ally. Mter a lengthy
and thorny struggle, Edward VII partially
succeeded; but he did not live to see how
the sood he had sown ruined France--
and finally threatened the British Empire.
In those days, France still had many
men of the highest integrity, men who
knew England well and who preferred to
go their own, a French way. Further-
more, great national hopes were placed
in colonial expansion. The creation of a
colonial empire gave France a new impulse
after her defeat of 1871 in the Franco-
Prussian War and became the Third
Republic's object of national ambition
and pride.
Because of French colonial ambitions,
France and England were frequently at
loggerheads. On one occasion it was
over Newfoundland, on another over the
New Hebrides or Siam. In those years
France had not given up her hopes for
Egypt, and Morocco was not yet French;
Britain still hoped to complete her hold
on the Mediterranean by the occupation
of Egypt as well as of Morocco with its
Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. Thus
there was friction time and again. As
late as in February 1887, Lord Salisbury
wrote to the British Ambassador in Paris:
"It is difficult not to wish for another
Franco-German war to finish with this
endless bother."
During the latt.er part of the last
century, relations between France and
Britain were 80 strained that part of the
British ruling class considered France the
more dangerous rival and was propared
to make permanent arrangements with
Germany, even at the cost of concessions
to Cermany in the Middle East and North
Africa. Bismarck declined this British
otTer because he would not tolerate the
idea of Germany acting the undignified
role of a counterweight against France
or any other country for England. Aware
of historical realities, he demanded only
the recognition of Germany's right to
live a. national life in security. He re-
fused to wage a preventive war against
France when it became clear that the
Third Republic was looking for revenge
and was again basing its -policy on
Richelieu's legacy. He also refused t()
become Britain's tool and to spill Ger-
man blood in support of Britain's ambi-
tions.
In the years after Bismarck's dismissal,
England gradually came to consider Ger-
many as her enemy No. 1. Of course, a.
nation regarded by Britain as her enemy
always has the alternative of voluntary
submission. But whoever refuses to sub-
mit at the given moment-be it Spain,
France, Holland, or Austria in former-
times, or Germany in our time--ealls
down upon himself the curse of righteous
British indignation. He is mercilessly
persecuted for wanting "world domina-
tion" and as the "disturber of worJd
peace."
"ENTENTE CORDIALE"
As soon as Great Britain had made up
her mind that Germany was the chief
enemy, France was automatically ex-
pected to become Britain's ally.
During a dinner in Marlborough House-
on February 28, 1902, Joseph Chamber-
lain had his first intimate discussion with
the French Ambassador Cambon on the-
possibility and necessity of an alliance
between the two countries. But France
had not yet then whoUy forgotten her
bitter political defeat at Fashoda in 1898
(see our issue of December 1942, page
380) and was in no mood to play the
role of the dupe in Britain's game. When
Edward VII arrived in Paris on an
official visit in May 1903. the Parisians
still greeted him with "Vive fes Boers!
Vive Marchand!" (Marchand woo,' the
namo of the French commander at
Fashoda.) Nevertheles:;, the foundation
was laid during this visit for negotiations
between the two powers.
Strange as it ma,y seem today. the
French politicians, blinded hy their desire
for revenge against Germany and fOl'
hegemony in Europe, fell into the British
trap. In June 1903, Lord Lansdowne
initiated the parleys with' Amba."lSador-
Cambon in earnest; and, after very dif-
ficult and protracted negotiations, an
accord on all outstanding colonial disputes.
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WM reached in 1904. In it Britain de-
clared that she had no interest in Moroc-
co, and France definitely lost Egypt,
which she had made accessible to Britain
at great cost in lives. France also 108t
the Suez Canal, which she had built.
In 1898 Fashoda had made the French
forget Alsace-Lorraine for a while; in
1904 the Entente Cordiale made the
French forget Fashoda and revived their
desire for Alsace-Lorraine. Now France
turned once more fully and actively to
her classic continental policy. The En-
tente Cordiale was a misfortune for
li'rance. From then on, her foreign
policy was determined in London. Brit-
iAh propaganda entered the country
freely. The chances ot coming to rea-
aonable terms with the German neighbor
dwindled. France had to train African
natives to fill up her divisions to con-
solidnte the pax britannica.
I f the Entente Cordiale had any mean-
ing at all for France, it was the recon-
qu ·t of Alsace-Lorraine, the conquest of
the left bank of the Rhine, and the dis-
memberment of Bismarck's Reich. Brit-
ain on her part wanted by means of
tho Entente Conliale to safeguard her
nin tc nth-century world ordor, to estab-
lish her position as supreme arbiter on
the Continent, and to furt,her her designs
beyond the seven seas on her march to
u.lldisputed world hegemony and world
exploitation. The Entente Cordiale was
the beginning of a gigantic encirclement
of Germany. with France and her RUBSian
ally UH Britain', swords which were to
det>troy Germany. For thi~ we have the
testimony of Lord Rosebery, for years
Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister of
the British Empiro (and son-in-law of a
Rothschild). TheRe are the worns with
wlli('h David Lloyd George begins his
six volumes of memoirs:
In ~h6 )'ear 1904, on the day when the Anglo.
Fren 'h Entente WlLS announced, 1 arrived at Dal·
m.my on a couple of day's viai~ w the late Lord
Ro ber)'. Bis finlt greeting w me was: "WcU,
1 IlUppOilC you are j list 68 plll88Cd lL8 the rest of
them with this French ngreemonU" 1 assured him
that 1 was delighted that our marling and scratch.
ing relations ,,;th France bad come to an end at
last. He replied: "You are aU wrong. It mewus
war with Germany in the endl"
All the world knows that a war followed
upon the Entente Cordiale. If Britain
managed to make the world beliove that
this war was a German war and that
Britain only entered the war to save
Belgium, France, civilization, and domoc-
racy, it shows that the British statesmen
before the Great War were cleveror than
those after that war, and that the Ger-
man statesmen had not learned much
from Bismarck.
For reasons of camouflage, to make
the world believe that this war was not
her war, Britain entered the war too late
to stop the German advance through
Belgium in 1914. Not until August 15
did the British land about five divisions
at Dunkirk, Calais, and Ostend, while
France had mobilized seventy divisioll8
and Germany had put seventy of her
divisions into the field on the western
front. By January 1918, the French
Command was still unable to obtain
approximate figures of the forces Britain
intended to send to France. By that
time, twenty-nine natioll8 had declared
war on Germany and her allies. France
had put her all into the struggle. Not
until the spring of that year, when an
Allied defeat seemed possible, did Britain
send all available forces to France.
When Germany was finally brought to
her knees, where did Britain's allies fi.nd
themselves~ Russil.\ was a prey to Bol-
sheviRm, Italy Wl\8 on the verge of a
revolution and France was hIed white
and exhau teo. (how exhausted, 1940 has
shown). So the peace turned out to be
a British peace and not a French ono.
DISAPPOINTMENT
'What had most Frenchmen, not to
speak of Clemenceau and Poincare, ex-
pected 8.'1 compenRation for France's
sacrifices during the four years of an
unprecedented war~
In his Intimitie8 de la HIe Ripubliq1U,
Ferdinand Bac describes a visit he made
at the beginning of 1918 to the former
French Ambassador to Berlin, whom he
found marking a big map with a red
pencil. The Ambassador said to Bac:
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"TIle Dews from tho front is good, in October
the WIU' will be over. One JDU6t start thinking
what our conditions must be .... With Alsaeo-
Lorraine we have the left bank of the Rhine. the
Oermo.ny or the Carolingians. PollUld will be
given SilOllia. Tho Reicll of Emperor Wilhelm
UlWlt be dismembered. Hanover mUllt return too
Englllnd. o.nd the RUll8ians will get East PrWlllia.
We will Ml6toro tho small northern GcrmlUl state8
with DreBden lUI the capital; wo will make n South
Oerman Jo'edernt;ion of Austria. Bavaria, Baden,
and Wiirttembcrg. with Vienna nil the capital.
In oth r words. w will return to tho tim before
1866.... III France I am republican. but to have
peaee we must restore the hWldrods or small Oer·
man principalities."
This is, no doubt, t.he meaning which
most Frenchmen had seen in the Entente
Cordiale, the meaning of Richelieu's
classic policy.
Britain had good reason to be satisfied
with. the settlement of the Great War:
Germany had no more navy and no
more colonies; to keep her away from
world politics would now be easy.
France, on the contrary, without the left
bank of the Rhine under her permanent
control. with Germany undivided, with a
devastated cOtultry, with delusive rep-
aration promises and heary war debts,
was not satisfied. In the distribution of
colonial spoils she hOO been largely
cheated; and for what she had received
in the Middle East, Britain caused her
as much trouble as possible. Britain
wanted the Middle East for herself and
wished to get France out of Syria.
(Churchill finished this job in 1941 by
occupying Syria and Lebanon.)
France was now faced by the choice
either of continuing her classic policy
toward Germa.ny or of finding a basis for
European soHdarity by coming to terms
with the falJen enemy. The German
statesmen, from Pre idcnt Ebert to Hit-
lcr, tried hard to come to an tulder-
standing with France. But, as Bruce
Lockhart says in his Retreat from Gianj,
anyone in France daring to suggest u.
policy of reconciliation with Germany
was considered a traitor. It is pathetic
to read the interview Bruce Lockhart
had with the German Chancellor Strese-
mann on April 13, 1929, in Berlin, six
months before Strescmann died, and in
which Stresemann said "that there were
no Germans who would fight for the
return of A1sace-Lorraine, but there waa
not a German from the ex-Kaiser to the
poorest Communist who would ever accept
the present German-Polish frontier. '" ith
a rectification of the Polish frontier Europe
could save peace for a hundred years."
ONE MORE "NO"
And Hitled He too tried to do away
with Versailles by peaceful means. Not-
withstanding the disappointment he suf-
fered at the Disarmament COIuerence of
1933 and his firm attitude toward the
League of Nations, he made great efforts
to arrange matters by negotiation. To
this end he submitted a memorandtun to
Britain in December 1933, asking her to
forward it also ta France. In this memo-
randum Hitler proposed the limitation
of Germany's armed forces to fifty per
.cent of the French effeotives in men and
material; the control, it was proposed,
to be international and reciprocal. A
somewhat different ItaHan memorandum
supported the German note.
The German memorandum was tul-
doubtedJy a proposal for total revision
of Versailles, inclusive of the territorial
clauses. France was therewith con-
fronted with a grave and fa.r-reaching
decision. She had the choice either of
taking Germany's proposal into con-
siderl~tion, with the pos ibility that she
would have to give up R.icheLieu's legacy,
or of rejecting it and reaffirming that
legacy. On April 17, 1934, about four
months after she had been approached.
France rejected the German proposals
and thereby manifested her decision to
uphold her postwar foreign policy and
the European status created by the
diotates concluded after the Great War.
After his victory in the Saar plebiscite,
Hitler declared that, for the sake of
peace, Gerol/LIlY was willing to renounce
all further claims on Alsace-Lorrainc and
on any other territorial changes along
her western border. Had France re-
ciprocated the offer by a likewise volull-
tary acceptance of her Versailles bounda-
ries as final, and without mental resen'a-
tion, such a deal, voluntarily arrived at,
would have closed a thousalld-year~old
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bad chapter of Franco-Gerl'nan and Euro-
pean history and would have given
Europe a. long period of peace. "'hen
Frallco continued t-o stick to the "West-
phalin,n idea" Germany rearmed without
the COli ant of France and tbe others Rnd
gavo preference to clLnnons instead of
butter. To the last, Hitler tried to come
to terms with Fra.nce. But by then
Britain had taken the lead, and' France
had become "'a back nuruber and un-
worth) of . upport," a the Britis.b Am-
hassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, st-tid to
.Dodd, the Am~rican Ambassador, in
Berli.n on June 23, IO:l7.
COLONIZED COLONIZERS
H w (lid France hope to carry out bel'
elas ic policy? Marshal Petain has stated
more than once: "\Ve lost the war because
we have not enough children." Hence,
feeling too weak henself to control the
development of Europe and to suppress
the rise of young, strong ideas, Fra.nce
had to put her trn t in others. She
organized colonial armies with which she
hoped to replace those mis;:ing children
and to regain her seventeenth-century
grandeur.
Apparently our lead rs never realized
that an army of primitive colonials could
not relJlace bel' missing children and gi\'e
Prance the nece sary prestige for a
hegemony on the Continent. They did
not realizo that, even with the colonial
army of one million men whicb Marsh[~l
Focil promised t-o enhst after the Great
\Var, they would not be able to illl pose
t,hoir will ami conditions ou the German
people for any length of time without
endangering their own race and national
existence. Having ernlmrked on a policy
of force, force had to be obtained from
where\"or it was obtainable and at any
cost.
Henry Champly. in his book Jl'lIile
Women, Colored .Men (1936) says in
despair: "We are being colonized by
ou.r colonials, by colored men." Ghamply
is deeply concerned about the future of
our race. He is afraid that France will
soon belong to the haH-breed races, and
he appeals to the French women to save
the Frencb mce, But the remedy
Champly proposes is in itself a haH-breed
one. a mixture of arrogance and decay.
Ob\~iously believillU that it is too late for
a complete Cl1ro. afraid of thc drastic
Moscow remedy of "complete mixture"
or tbe fl\,llical Berlin "pure Aryan"
remedy, and believing in the superiority
of the so-called "democraoies:' he pro-
poses a slow process "of adaptation, of
alJoy, of alliance" with colored races. In
other words, the Moscow prescription
applied in small doses.
THE WEn OF ALLlANCJo:S
As the nogroes of the French Empire
were obviou Iy not enough to support
France's European claim , she had to
look for allie. She drifted back to the
same system of alliauces which had pre-
cipitated the world into the Ureat War,
only in t\ manifoldly oxaggemted form.
A system of alliances always creates
cou.ntermea ures and makes wars un-
avoidable. In this particular case, the
French alliances practically. abotaged the
League of Nations, the real purpose of
which was supposed t,o bo the bringing
about of co-operation alllong the nations.
on an equal bl-tSi, with fairness and
justice for all. Furtbermore, the French
system of alliance' wa~, from the begin-
ning, not an altogether one-sided business:
France's allies also expected something
in return. Feeling their combined might,
they became arrogant. Finally, the time
came when they grew unml1.nagoable and
imposed their will upon~their partner.
In 1939 it was largely owing to the Polish
attitude that the French and British
negotiations with the Soviet l nion failed,
a fact which greatly contributed to
France's catastrophe a yeur later.
A system of alliances is the vicious
circle in politicl:l. Besides causing herself
and otherR a good deal of trOllhie by her
alliances, France was compelled on the
fateful third of September 1939, whether-
she liked it or not to follow Britain and
to declare war on Germany at a ti.me
when she was in no way propared for
war. Nominally, her obligation resulted
from her a~unce with Poland; in reahty,..
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France had lost her independence and
become a sort of British dominion on the
<day she signed the Entente Cordiale.
As France's system of alliances meant
nothing but the encirclement of Germany,
and as it was generally f€it that encircle-
ment is in itself a form of aggression,
this system was ennobled by the new
name of "collectiVf' security." Collective
security was defined by Lord Lothian in
his speech in the House of Lords on
March 2, 1937, when he said:
"The argument that the nations which are
ea,isfied with the 8tatUII quo, the natioll.ll which
"Want to prevent any alt.eratioJ18, should enter into
eornething like a military alliance in order that
they may be overwhelmingly and collectively
stronger than any nation that seeks to alter the
atatus quo, is nothing but the modernization of
what in my view has boon the fatal policy which
has been maintained by the French Government
..moo 1920."
It is noteworthy that France's net of
alliances was to a large extent spun
.around the Germany of \Veimar, long
before Hitler became a. factor in Germa.n
politics, indeed, even before Mein Kampf
had been written. But after Hitler's
advent to power, renewed diplomatic
activity became noticeable between
France aud her satellites.
THE CHOICE
What did France choose? The im-
possible. In the forlorn hope of winning
a "Westphalian Peace" after all, France
declared Versailles to be the public law,
the international order, the Magna Charta
for the coming centuries. Minor changes,
to which France yielded under pressure,
were too insignificant to improve the
situation created by her policy. Rec-
onciliation WaS rejected.
In pursuance of Richelieu's legacy, in
order to triumph completely over one of
the most vital forces on the European
continent and in the world, France hoped
not only to perpetuate the status created
The French System of Alliances, 1919/39
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by Versailles but also to obtain what
Versailles had withheld from her. This
is what one finds when analyzing the
French postwar foreign policy; this alone
was to all appearances the French post-
war "idea."
Would history have blamed France
for her policy if she had had the
might, the moral power, and spirit on
which such a policy must be based?
Probably not. Because this policy ended
in failure, most Frenchmen believe that
their government's policy as such was
right, but that the execution was wrong.
A few of us, however, realized long ago
that the policy was wrong because it was
based on a moral and physical might
which France no longer possessed.
Under such conditions alliances become
mortgages with all the risks of foreclosure
involved, especially if one has over-
<:harged one's assets. France and her
<:ontinental allies could not impose their
will on Germany without Britain. And
Britain, after the Great War, wanted
peace for the consolidation of her gains
and a Germany strong enough to counter-
balance an aggressive France. Only when
-Germany again grew stronger than the
British idea of balance permitted and
when she refused to be governed by
London, did Britain change her postwar
policy and concentrate her enmity against
'Germany.
In the early thirties, Lucas Dubreton
wrote in the CrapouiUQt:
What we know is that since 1918 we had to be
-content with the most disagreeable things from
our British neighbors. that they always did their
best to fetter. to obstruct. or to minimize us.
One must be naive to be surprised at that: never
h&8 England given a sign that 8he would leave
the 8upremacy. or even the superiority on the
-Continent to anyone nation. Since then the
British have received several shocks. and this may
bring WI once more to a time in whioh they will
.again be more polite and friendly toward us.
Dubreton waa right. In August 1934
Baldwin stated in the House of Commons
that Britain's frontiers were not the
white cMs of Dover but the Rhine. In
.June 1936 Duff-Cooper, Minister of War,
told the French: "Your frontier is our
frontier!" And on July 27, 1938, Lord
Halifax declared: "The friendship exist-
ing between both countries no longer
depends on written agreements but is
based on common thoughts and aims."
London had again taken over the direc-
tion of France's foreign affairs.
One may wonder how France could
ever have been fooled into the Entente
Cordiale and into fighting for England
during the Great War. But that France,
after all the experiences made during the
Peace Conference at Paris and afterwards,
followed a policy which again played into
the hands of the British and made France
fight England's war, was more than
foolish: it was criminal.
Lord Lothian, a man who knew much
about the world between the two world
wars, wrote a sentence on January 31,
1935, in The Timea, which brilliantly
illuminates the situation of this period:
"War comes far more frequently from
inability to change out-of-date political
arrangementa in time than from direct
aggression.' ,
For her inability to change out-of-date
political arrangements France has had to
pay a terrible price. Britain pushed her
aside and occupied the place of the spider
in the web France had woven. France
herself became only one of the many
flies entangled in the web which England
now proceeded to use for her own policy,
a policy which led in 1940 to the collapse
of France.
Only a complete change of the ante-
diluvian mentality of Europe and of the
traditional political maxims of Britain
and France, an all-round spiritual re-
birth, can save Europe and her civiliza-
tion from complete ruin. This warning
was distinctly written on the wall in
1918. To have deliberately ignored this
warning, to have broken faith with
humanity at Versailles, not to have paved
the way leading toward a new Europe.
are the mortal sins of the Allies after
their victory. The fiIlal result could
only be frightful destruction.
"Nothing is settled finally until it is
Battled rj,ghtl" said Abraham Lincoln.
The time has come again for France to
settle matters right. Will she do it1
